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Abstract
We introduce and experimentally test an auction model that allows for outside options of bidders
as substitutes for the auctioned object under the private values assumption. Theoretically and in
the experiments, bidders respond to their individual outside options and to variations of common
knowledge about competitors’ outside options. Interestingly, private outside options induce concave
equilibrium bidding functions with uniformly distributed valuations. The bidding data does support
this property. As theoretically predicted, lower-valued outside options lead individuals to bid more
aggressively in the experiments.
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1 Introduction
During the last decade, auctions have increasingly attracted attention from academia and the wider public.
A major part of this increased interest is due to growing popularity of using auctions as market institutions
for C2C and B2C transactions, allocating public resources and procurement contracts. Cases in point are
worldwide spectrum auctions, online auction platforms such as eBay and Ricardo and virtual B2B market
places, e.g. Covisint for the automotive industry or Consip’s AiR for Italian public procurement offers.
Often outside options are available to bidders in addition to the object offered in the particular auc-
tion. For the purpose of illustration, suppose that individual A has the opportunity to buy a used watch
either from a friend at some price or to participate in an online auction where a similar watch is offered.
A’s decision on the amount to bid for the watch in the auction might depend on the value she derives
from seizing her outside option, i.e. from transacting with her friend.
To our knowledge, there is no literature on the effects of auction-exogenous outside options on behav-
ior of bidders with heterogenous valuations. With identical bidder valuations and private, independent
outside options, the model reduces to the standard symmetric independent private values model (SIPV),
see Holt (1980). In Weber (1983), Gale and Hausch (1994), and Reiß and Schöndube (2002), outside
options are endogenized by another, subsequently conducted auction as a mutually exclusive transac-
tion alternative since bidders have single-object demand. The laboratory study of the sequential auction
model in the latter paper suggests that alternative transaction opportunities are an important determinant
of bidding behavior (see Brosig and Reiß, 2003). In order to isolate outside option effects from other
strategic considerations arising with transaction alternatives such as entry decisions or Bayesian updat-
ing, we augment the SIPV model to allow for auction-exogenous public and private outside options and
implement it in the laboratory to assess its predictive power. According to the data generated in our
extensive laboratory experiment, the comparative static predictions of the augmented theory match ob-
served behavior and clearly provide evidence for the bidding decision’s dependence on available outside
options.
The plan of the paper is as follows: in section 2 we introduce outside options into the symmetric
independent private values auction model and derive equilibrium bidding strategies for the first-price and
second-price auctions, section 3 describes our experimental design and section 4 discusses the experi-
mental data.
2 The Symmetric Independent Private Values auction model with outside
options
There are n risk-neutral individuals who maximize expected utility. Each individual has a valuation for
an object that is for sale in an auction. Individual i’s valuation is denoted by vi. Individuals have unit-
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demand for that object. In addition, each individual has access to a transaction alternative that can be
substituted for the object in the auction. The value that an individual derives from executing her outside
option instead of receiving the object auctioned off is denoted by w.1 We distinguish between public and
private outside options. With public outside options, each individual derives the same benefit from the
outside option. This is common knowledge. In contrast, private outside options are individual-specific
and private information. In subsection 2.2 we introduce public outside options into the SIPV model and
solve for bidding strategies in the first-price and second-price auction, in subsection 2.3 we extend the
SIPV model to allow for private outside option, derive equilibrium bidding behavior in the first-price and
second-price auction, and describe the model’s efficiency properties.
2.1 Bidding without outside options
Suppose that individual valuations vi of the object that is offered in an auction are private information
and independently and identically distributed according to cumulative density function F (vi) where
vi ∈ [v¯
,v¯]. We assume throughout auctions without reserve price to concentrate on bidder behavior.
Without outside options, the Bayes-Nash equilibrium bidding functions for the first- and second-price
auctions are well-known (e.g. Riley and Samuelson, 1981, and Vickrey, 1961): for the first-price auction
we have b fp(v) = v −
R v
v
¯
Fn−1(x)dx/Fn−1(v) and for the second-price auction bsp(v) = v.
2.2 Public outside options
This is the easy case. In addition to valuation vi that individual i places on the auctioned object, the
value that individual i derives from executing her public outside option instead of receiving the object
is the same for all individuals and equals wi = w ∀i = 1, .., n. In particular, we assume w ≤ v¯
. This
ensures that every individual voluntarily participates in the auction. For any auction design for which
payoff equivalence applies, it is straightforward to derive equilibrium bidding functions by application
of the payoff equivalence theorem. We illustrate this for the case of the first-price sealed-bid auction.
From payment equivalence with the boundary condition that the lowest valuation type v
¯
which never
wins the auction in equilibrium always receives his outside optionw, we obtain (cf. Riley and Samuelson,
1981, eq. 8b) the expected equilibrium payment for a representative bidder with valuation v:
P (v) = vFn−1(v)−w−
Z v
v
¯
Fn−1(x)dx. (1)
For the first-price design with the modification that any bidder receives w if he is unsuccessful in the
auction, the expected equilibrium payment is given by
P (v) = Fn−1(v) bfp-pb(v)−
£
1− Fn−1(v)
¤
w. (2)
1Valuations of transaction alternatives are net of transaction costs. If, for instance, an alternative object is offered at a posted
price, then w represents the value of the outside option net of its price. If there are many alternatives, then w corresponds to the
best alternative net of prices.
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Setting both expressions for the expected equilibrium payment, (1) and (2), equal to each other
and solving for bfp-pv(v) leads to the intuitive result that the equilibrium bid under the first-price design
with public outside option precisely matches that without public outside options reduced by the outside
option’s value:
bfp-pb(v,w) = bfp(v)−w
where bfp(v) is the equilibrium bidding function in the first-price auction without outside options defined
in the preceding subsection.
In the second-price auction the weakly dominant bidding strategy is given by:2
bsp-pb(v,w) = v −w.
Since without outside options the above bidding functions always imply efficient allocations in equi-
librium, it is obvious that public outside options do not destroy this property.
2.3 Private outside options
Again, individual i’s valuation is vi and the value that she derives from executing her outside option iswi.
Valuation pairs (v, w) ∈ [v
¯
, v¯]× [w
¯
, w¯] are independently distributed across individuals according to the
probability density function f(v, w) and are private information. The assumption of jointly distributed
valuations for a given individual allows for correlation between v and w: it might be sensible to assume
that a higher v implies a higher w and lower v tend to occur together with lower w. Again we assume
that the lowest valuation is not lower than the outside option, i.e. v
¯
≥ w¯ ensuring that each individual
submits a bid in the auction, otherwise there are some types who prefer the outside option to the object
auctioned off even if the auction price equals zero. Figure 1 illustrates the type space.
Next we derive and discuss equilibrium bidding strategies for the first-price auction. In subsection
2.3.3 we show that private outside options in the first-price bidding model with uniformly distributed
valuations yield concave bidding functions. In subsection 2.3.4 we derive equilibrium bidding functions
for the second-price auction and in 2.3.5 we describe the efficiency properties of the augmented model.
2.3.1 Equilibrium bidding: first-price auction
In order to derive the equilibrium bidding strategy in the first-price auction, we represent the bidding
model in a way that allows its solution with standard procedures. For this, consider the utility maximiza-
tion problem of the representative risk-neutral individual i that submits bid bi in the auction and faces
the outside option wi:
max
bi
Pr(bi wins) · (vi − bi) + [1− Pr(bi wins)] ·wi
2The proof is identical to that for the equilibrium bidding strategy under the second-price auction with private outside
options, see below.
4
vi
v
vi = wi
wi
v
w w
Figure 1: Type space (v, w)
This program can be rearranged to
max
bi
Pr(bi wins) · (vi −wi − bi) +wi
Since the outside option wi is known to the individual and a constant, the argmax of that problem is the
same as the one of the following problem where the new variable xi := vi −wi is introduced
max
bi
Pr(bi wins) · (xi − bi) (3)
We interpret the x ∈ [v
¯
−w¯, v¯−w
¯
] as an individual’s net valuation of the object that is offered in the
auction that takes into account the opportunity cost of winning the auction and foregoing the outside
option. The logic of the transformation of the original maximization problem into (3) is to suppose that
the representative individual executes her outside option wi before bidding in the auction, then bids in
the auction, and, since she has unit-demand, in case she wins the auction "repays" her outside option in
addition to the price of the auctioned object.
By this simple transformation we have a standard bidding problem in net valuations x. All there
remains to do is to identify the probability density function that governs the distribution process of net
valuations. Note that a number of (actually infinitely many) valuation pairs (v,w) leads to the identical
net valuation x¯. Figure 2 depicts some iso-net-valuation-curves in two different type spaces to illustrate
this. By definition, iso-net-valuation-curves are given in w-v-space since v = x¯+w. Obviously "higher"
iso-net-valuation-curves are associated with higher net valuations. The probability density function of a
given net valuation x is obtained by "summing up" all densities over the corresponding iso-net-valuation
curve as follows
fX(x) =
min{w¯,v¯−x}Z
max{w
¯
,v
¯
−x}
f(x+w,w)dw.
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Given a well-defined fX(x) with support [v¯
−w¯, v¯−w
¯
] and cumulative density function FX(x), we can
invoke standard results to derive the equilibrium bidding function (e.g. Riley and Samuelson, 1981)
assuming that there is no reserve price in the auction:
bfp-pr(x) = x−
R x
v
¯
−w¯ F
n−1
X (y)dy
Fn−1X (x)
.
By resubstitution, the equilibrium bidding function for our model is:
bfp-pr(v,w) = v −w−
R v−w
v
¯
−w¯ F
n−1
X (y)dy
Fn−1X (v −w)
which is strictly increasing in v and strictly decreasing in w since ∂b/∂x > 0 and ∂x/∂v = −∂x/∂w =
1.
2.3.2 Example: v ∈ U [50, 100], w ∈ U [0, 50], n = 2
Suppose (v, w) ∈ [50, 100] × [0, 50] with f(v, w) = 1/2, 500 and n = 2. It follows for net valuations
that x ∈ [0, 100]. The cumulative density function of X ≡ V −W is given by
FX(x) =



x2
5,000 if x ∈ [0, 50]
200x−x2−5,000
5,000 if x ∈ [50, 100].
As a result, the symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium bidding function is given by
bfp-pr(x) =



2
3x if x ∈ [0, 50]
300x2−2x3−250,000
600x−3x2−15,000 if x ∈ [50, 100].
Please note that bids and slopes at the potential discontinuity at x = 50 coincide at "both sides". The
bidding function depending on (v,w) is simply obtained by resubstitution:
bfp-pr(v,w) =



2
3(v −w) if (v −w) ∈ [0, 50]
300(v−w)2−2(v−w)3−250,000
600(v−w)−3(v−w)2−15,000 if (v −w) ∈ [50, 100].
Figure 3 displays a corridor of equilibrium bidding functions bfp-pv(v, w) and the equilibrium bidding
function that ignores outside options bfp(v) = 25 + v/2.
2.3.3 Concavity of equilibrium bidding functions
The parameterization of the preceding example with uniformly valuations and outside options leads to
concave equilibrium bidding functions. The equilibrium bidding function in net valuations x is shown
in figure 4. It is linear over interval [0, 50] and strictly concave over interval (50, 100]. Every bid-
ding function bfp-pr(v, w) is strictly concave in valuation v over some range if w < 50. The function
bfp-pr(v,w = 50) is linear in v. Indeed, any bidding function bfp-pr(v,w) that is in the corridor of the
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Figure 2: Iso-net-valuation-curves v = x¯+w in two type spaces.
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Figure 4: Equilibrium bidding function bfp-pr(x)
preceding figure 3 for a given outside option value w and valuations v ∈ [0, 50], is nested in figure 4
where its image corresponds to the image of net valuations over the subdomain [50−w, 100−w]. It can
be seen from the figure that equilibrium bidding functions for given w become "more concave" in v as
the value of the outside option decreases. For the largest outside option value w = 50, it is linear. As the
outside option’s value decreases, the bidding function becomes strictly concave over a larger portion of
its domain. With the lowest outside option value w = 0, the bidding function is strictly concave over its
full domain.
2.3.4 Equilibrium bidding: second-price auction
Any individual i prefers to win the auction if the value net of payment that she derives from receiving
the object in the auction is not lower than the value she derives from executing her outside option. Thus,
individual i prefers winning the second-price auction if
vi − bˆ−i ≥ wi
where the left-hand side is the return that she receives if her bid exceeds the largest competing bid bˆ−i.
Using the definition of net valuations x := v −w, this can be rewritten to
xi ≥ bˆ−i.
Since winner i’s payment for the auctioned object is always determined by the fiercest competitors’
bidding behavior (denoted by bˆ−i), utility maximization reduces to the selection of a bid that always
wins the auction if the above inequality holds and never wins it if the inequality is violated. Clearly,
bidding exactly the net valuation xi is a weakly dominant strategy, the reasons are standard and detailed
below.
There are two alternatives to bidding xi: either bidding a larger or a smaller amount (overbidding or
undercutting, respectively). Consider both bidding alternatives:
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• Overbidding: if bidder i overbids, say he submits xi + δ, then there are three possibilities: (a)
bˆ−i > xi + δ > xi: both, overbidding and bidding xi, doesn’t win the auction leading to the same
outcome; (b) xi + δ > xi ≥ bˆ−i: again, overbidding and bidding xi lead to the same return, this
time both strategies win the auction at the same price below xi (or both generate a return of zero
if xi = bˆ−i); (c) now consider xi + δ ≥ bˆ−i > xi: here overbidding wins the object resulting in a
loss (bˆ−i − xi) while bidding xi prevents this. It follows that overbidding either leads to the same
payoff (a and b) or to a lower payoff (c) than bidding xi.
• Undercutting: if bidder i submits a lower bid than his net valuation, say xi − δ, then, again it can
be made the argument that payoffs are either same under both strategies or undercutting performs
worse. Undercutting precisely leads to lower payoffs if xi > bˆ−i > xi− δ: then the bidder doesn’t
win the auction though bidding xi would have allowed him winning it with a profit at bˆ−i.
Since overbidding and undercutting either result in the same or lower payoffs than bidding the true
net valuation xi, the latter must be weakly dominant.
2.3.5 Efficiency with private outside options
We know that in the case without outside options and also in the case with public outside options, always
efficient allocations are implemented in equilibrium. Here we show that efficiency is also obtained with
private outside options. If there is the possibility of an inefficient allocation then there must be any
unsuccessful bidder who can engage in a trade with the successful bidder such that the successful bidder
is compensated for giving up the object he won in the auction for her outside option and the unsuccessful
bidder is better off with the object he didn’t win in the auction. Suppose that such a trade is feasible,
then the lowest amount the winner of the auction must receive in order to be compensated for resorting
to his outside option is p := vs − ws. The amount that the unsuccessful bidder gets if he receives the
auctioned object from the auction winner instead of executing his outside option is q := vu − wu. In
an inefficient allocation, the unsuccessful bidder’s gain must exceed his payment to the auction winner,
i.e. q > p. By the definition of net valuations this is equivalent to xu > xs which implies via b0(x) > 0
that bu > bs. This, of course, contradicts the assumption that the unsuccessful trader lost the auction.
Therefore, first-price and second-price auctions where outside options are taken care of appropriately
result in Pareto-efficient allocations since these award the auctioned object to the bidder with the largest
net valuation.
3 Experimental design and procedures
To test the theoretical implications of public and private outside options in the SIPV model, we devised
three treatments that were implemented in a between-subjects design. In the baseline treatment A we
9
ran standard auction games without outside options under the independent private value assumption with
two bidders where the highest bid wins. Bids and valuations were denominated in experimental currency
units (ECU). Each experiment session had twelve auction rounds in the strangers-matching design. In
each auction round, we used the strategy method to elicit a subject’s continuous bidding function by
asking for bids that correspond to the six hypothetical valuations 50,60,70,80,90,100. Bids for inter-
mediate valuations were determined by linear interpolation between the discrete bids. The particular
bidding function that a subject specified by entering a set of bids was graphically displayed at all times.3
Subjects were free to adjust their set of entered bids and thereby their specified bid functions as often
as they wished. Bids had to be nonnegative and were entered via keyboard. Recently, the collection
of entire bidding schedules in each round of auction experiments gained popularity but the particular
implementation varies between studies. Selten and Buchta (1999) introduced the strategy method for
auction experiments. In their experiments, subjects could specify a piecewise linear bidding functions
with up to 10,000 segments either using a graphical input mode or via keyboard. Their implementation
suffered from the problem that subjects might have been drawing "interesting landscapes" since 46%
of observed bidding functions were nonmonotonic (p. 81). Pezanis-Christou and Sadrieh (2004) used
a simplified version of the Selten and Buchta (1999) implementation where subjects could specify two
piecewise segments to allow for a single kink in the bidding schedule. In their study, approximately 15%
of bidding functions are nonmonotonic in their asymmetric auction treatments and approximately 5% in
their symmetric auction treatments.4 In the experimental studies of Güth et al. (2002, 2003) the set of
possible valuations was restricted to eleven values. For each of the eleven valuations, subjects had to
enter a corresponding bid. Unfortunately, these two studies do not report the share of observed bidding
schedules that are nonmonotonic. A characteristic common to all implementations including ours is that
subjects were required to submit their bidding schedules before their valuations were drawn unlike in
earlier studies.
A distinctive feature of our design is that pairs of matched subjects participated in five unrelated
auctions after specification of their bidding schedules instead of one single auction. For each of these five
auctions and for each of the subjects, a valuation was independently drawn from a uniform distribution
with support [50,100] and rounded to two decimal places. In each of the five auctions, subjects’ bids
were determined according to their specified bidding functions and their valuations. In each auction, the
high bidder received the difference between valuation and bid. In our baseline treatment A, the other
bidder received nothing. Subjects were informed about their five valuations, their submitted bids, the
high bidder, the high-bid, and their income in all five auctions; they were also informed about their
income in this round which was the sum of the five auction incomes. No information about competitor’s
valuations, incomes, and losing bids was revealed. A list of experiments is given in table 1.
3Screenshots are provided in the appendix.
4The percentages are inferred from clearly visible bar charts, figures 3 and 5.
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Table 1: List of experiment sessions
Treatment Session
Number of
Subjects
Type of
outside option
Number of
matching groups
ECU/Euro
A 1 14 none 1 25
A 2 14 none 1 25
A 3 18 none 2 35
B 4 18 public 2 120
B 5 16 public 2 120
B 6 18 public 2 120
C 7 16 private 2 150
C 8 18 private 2 150
C 9 20 private 2 150
C 10 18 private 2 150
In treatment, B and C, the procedures of treatment A were modified to allow for an outside option
that was implemented as a fixed income for the low bidder. The values of the outside options were drawn
from a uniform distribution with support [0,50] for four auction rounds, rounded to two decimal places
and announced to each individual bidder before subjects specified their bidding functions. Treatments B
and C differed in the amount of information that subjects had about their competitors’ outside options.
In treatment B, the outside option was public in the sense that both bidders would have received the
same fixed income if they had happened to be the low bidder. In treatment C, outside options were pri-
vate information and it was common knowledge that outside options were independently and uniformly
distributed over the interval [0,50].
At the beginning of each experiment session, subjects took a brief treatment-specific computerized
quiz to ensure their familiarity with the instructions and the experiment they were about to participate
in. At the end of the last auction round, subjects went through a brief computerized questionnaire. Upon
completion, they received their earned income converted into Euros in cash. Subjects that participated in
treatment A received in addition a show-up fee of 3 Euro at the end of the experiment. The experiment
was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999).
Equilibrium predictions Table 2 presents the equilibrium bidding strategies derived from our aug-
mented auction model for our specific treatments (obviously treatment A is a special case of treatment B
without outside option).
In figure 5, the equilibrium bidding function for the baseline treatment, bA(v) is drawn as well as a
corridor of bidding functions for treatment C that is characterized by its lower bound bC(x = v − 50)
and its upper bound bC(x = v − 0); any bidding function for treatment B, bB(v, w) is a parallel line to
11
Table 2: Equilibrium bidding predictions
Treatment RNNE equilibrium prediction Bid range
A bA(v) = 25 + v2 b
A ∈ [50, 75]
B bB(v,w) = 25 + v2 −w b
B ∈ [0, 75]
C bC(x) =



2
3x if x ∈ [0, 50]
100x2−2/3x3−250,000/3
200x−x2−5,000 if x ∈ [50, 100] b
C ∈ [0, 50]
where x ≡ v −w
bA(v) where the "vertical distance" is equal to the outside option’s value w.
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Figure 5: Bidding predictions for Treatments A, B, and C
4 Experimental results
The plan of this section is to provide a brief description of the data that we obtained, to discuss the
monotonicity of observed bidding functions and then to discuss the effects of outside options and ef-
ficiency. In the remainder of this section, we investigate if observed bidding functions are concave in
treatment C as predicted.
4.1 Monotonicity of collected bidding functions
A key feature of our experimental design is that subjects specified an entire bidding function in each
auction round. Across all treatments and rounds, 2,040 bidding functions were specified by 170 subjects.
From all of these bidding functions, 1,804 are monotonic increasing in valuation v (88.4%), 44 are
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constant (2.2%), five are decreasing (0.3%), and 186 are nonmonotonic with either peaks or troughs
(9.1%). Table 3 provides a breakdown by treatment.
Table 3: Monotonicity of observed bidding functions
Monotonicity of treatment A treatment B treatment C sum
bidding functions (no outs. opt.) (public outs. opt.) (private outs. opt.)
strictly decreasing 1 (0.1%) 1 (0.05%)
weakly decreasing 1 (0.1%) 4 (0.5%) 5 (0.25%)
constant 2 (0.4%) 19 (3.1%) 23 (2.7%) 44 (2.16%)
weakly increasing 378 (68.5%) 410 (65.7%) 543 (62.9%) 1,331 (65.25%)
strictly increasing 123 (22.3%) 139 (22.3%) 211 (24.4%) 473 (23.19%)
nonmonotonic 49 (8.9%) 55 (8.8%) 82 (10.0%) 186 (9.12%)
sum 552 624 864 2,040
In contrast to the experimental data reported in Selten and Buchta (1999) where 46% of the col-
lected bidding functions were nonmonotonic, the phenomenon of drawing interesting landscapes with
bidding functions seems not to be a problem with our design since only a minority of bidding functions
is nonmonotonic (9.1%) and allows for those landscapes.5
4.2 Raw bidding data
Before we begin our analysis of the effects of outside options on bidding behavior, it is worthwhile to
take a brief look at the bidding data that we obtained. In all treatments, individuals were asked to specify
a bidding function given their outside option in every round (in treatment A, the value of the outside
options equals zero). In order to represent the bidding functions that participants in our experiments have
submitted as stepwise linear functions, we will in the next few paragraphs concentrate on bids. For each
bidding function that was submitted we will randomly draw five valuations to represent pairs of bids and
valuations. We take the same five randomly drawn valuations that we also used in the experiment to
determine the payoff and to give feedback to participants.
4.2.1 Treatment A - no outside options
Figure 6 illustrates the bidding data that we obtained in the baseline treatment A where there was no
outside option available to any of the bidders. If bidders have no outside option then valuations of the
object that is offered in the auction coincide with net valuations, i.e. xi = vi since wi = 0. The lower
line in the scatterplot indicates the RNNE-bidding prediction and the upper indicates the naive bidding
strategy "bid your valuation". Each dot represents one of the five bids that were calculated according
5Some observed bidding functions are provided in the appendix.
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to the submitted bidding function and for the five randomly drawn valuations in each round a single
bid that was submitted. Since 46 individuals participated in treatment A and 5 valuations were drawn
in each of 12 rounds, there are 2,760 data points.6 The dashed line is a median spline fitted to the bid
data. Indeed, we observe bids that are higher than the RNNE prediction, but only for large individual
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Figure 6: Bidding data for treatment A
valuations. For small individual valuations, bids appear smaller than the RNNE predicts. Why is this
so? One difference between the studies by Cox et al. (1982), Cox et al. (1988), Dorsey and Razzolini
(2003), Isaac and Walker (1985), Ockenfels and Selten (2002) and ours is that in their studies the lowest
valuation is zero or very close to zero. This is not the case in our experiment. We are aware of two other
studies where the lowest valuation is significantly larger than zero (Güth et. al. 2003; Chen and Plott
1998). In the first study, the authors report some underbidding with low valuations and overbidding with
high valuations, unfortunately statistical tests are not provided. In Chen and Plott (1998), individual-
wise estimated intercepts of linear bidding functions are reported to not significantly differ from the
RNNE/CRRA prediction for 86% of the subjects (p. 66). Unfortunately, this number includes 50% of
subjects that was faced with a lowest possible valuation equal to zero (the other 50% faced a lowest
possible valuation equaling 500.) Since negative bids were either excluded (not reported in the paper)
or very unlikely to be observed in that experiment (since the provided instructions are silent on this
possibility), it is not obvious that there was no underbidding observed. In order to address this issue, we
have conducted further experiments that significantly point to the fact that underbidding occurs if it is
not precluded by experimental design, see Kirchkamp and Reiß (2004).
6The figure depicts only 2,752 data points due to the scale choice for the vertical axis. In the first round, one subject specified
a bidding schedule comprising six data points where the lowest boundary equals 110.06 resulting in five invisible data points.
Also in the first round, another subject submitted the bids 115.07 and 120.49 for the valuations 93.38 and 96.99, respectively.
Another subject once bid 153.04 for valuation 99.72.
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4.2.2 Treatment B - public outside options
In treatment B, every individual faced an outside option that coincided with the outside option of his
competitor which was commonly known. The next figure illustrates how observed bids relate to the
theoretical bid prediction that underlies the corresponding (valuation, outside option)-pair. Since public
outside options vary and the RNNE bidding function doesn’t depend solely on net valuations, we trans-
form the bidding data by adding w/2 to each observed bid such that the data is readily comparable to the
transformed RNNE bidding function bB(v,w) +w/2 (= 25+ x/2) that only depends on net valuations.
Since there are 52 individuals who participated in this treatment, figure 7 plots 3,120 data points.
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Figure 7: Bidding data for treatment B (all bids)
4.2.3 Treatment C - private outside options
Figure 8 illustrates data for treatment C where every bidder’s outside option was private information
such that the competitor’s outside option were unknown. The lower line in the figure corresponds to the
RNNE-equilibrium function, the upper line is 45-degree-line. Please note that the data points that lie
beyond the 45-degree line do not necessarily indicate that there was bidding-above valuation since the
horizontal axis gives net valuations, i.e. valuations minus the value of the outside option. Again, each
dot represents a single bid. Since 72 individuals participated in treatment C over 12 rounds, there are
4,320 data points. Although there is some underbidding, overbidding the RNNE-prediction seems to be
the predominant behavioral pattern in both figures. (However, the lowest boundary of net valuations is
zero.)
4.3 Effect of outside options on bidding
4.3.1 Public outside options
In each of the three experimental sessions for treatment B, subjects faced three different randomly drawn
values as their public outside options. Including treatment A with w = 0, we obtained bidding data
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Figure 8: Bidding data for treatment C (all bids)
for w ∈ {0.00, 10.51, 12.79, 14.59, 23.49, 25.82, 25.96, 37.28, 44.24, 46.07}. The following figure
clearly shows that observed bidding behavior is affected by the value of public outside options. In
the left panel, median splines for bidding data conditional on the outside option’s value w are plotted.
Median splines for treatment B are constructed from 1,000, 1,040 and 1,080 data points, respectively. The
median spline for treatment A is constructed from 2,760 data points. As the value of the outside option
increases, e.g. from zero to levels between 10 and 15 ECU, median bids pronouncedly decrease. The
right hand panel illustrates the theoretical equilibrium predictions. The prediction for a given valuation
v corresponds to a range of bids since similar outside options are grouped in the same way as in the
left panel. In the figure, bid prediction ranges are indicated by the shaded areas. It is easy to see that
the qualitative comparative static effect found in the data is in line with the behavior of equilibrium
bidding functions. Intuitively, as the opportunity cost of bidding increases (=value of foregoing the
outside option), winning the auction becomes less important and thus leads to less aggressive bidding.
This implies that the quality of the equilibrium prediction for first-price bidding data that ignores outside
options deteriorates as public outside options gain importance.
From Figure 9 it appears that median splines are "steeper" than the corresponding equilibrium pre-
dictions. However, it is difficult to see if the predicted comparative static effects due changes in w are
quantitatively reproduced in the laboratory. In order to resolve both issues, we estimate linear bidding
functions for treatments A and B separately and pooled. Calculations of standard errors take into account
that observations might be correlated within matching groups but not across matching groups; Rogers,
1993). The regression results are summarized in table 4. The estimated coefficient of the public outside
option value w suggests that it has a strong negative impact on bidding behavior. However, the negative
impact of public outside options on bidding data observed in the data, βˆw = −0.77, is significantly
weaker than theoretically predicted, βw = −1 (t5 = 9.1647, p = 0.000). The slopes of all equilibrium
bidding functions are equal to 1/2. Though estimated slopes are positive, they significantly exceed 1/2
(t5 = 105.27, p = 0.000).
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Figure 9: Bidding behavioral effects of public outside options
The result that individuals do not fully expropriate their outside option by bidding too high is inter-
esting in light of the debate on the declining price anomaly (see Ashenfelter and Graddy, 2003, and the
references therein). If this expropriation failure arises with endogenous outside options, too, then one
might expect a series of falling prices as observed in the field.
4.3.2 Private outside options
In order to get a first impression if there is any effect of the private outside option on bidding behavior,
the bidding data is classified into five groups according to the value of the outside option. The five ranges
for outside options are (0,10), (10,20), (20,30), (30,40), and (40,50). In the left panel of figure 10, median
bids conditional on the outside option value range and over individuals and rounds are plotted for each of
the valuations in {50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100} for which subjects keyed in their bids. Median bids are con-
structed from 152-204 entered bids, the precise number depends on the particular outside option range.
One pattern in the data deserves particular attention: bids tend to decrease in the value of the outside
option as in the case of public outside options. To compare the bidding data to the theoretical bench-
mark, the corresponding equilibrium predictions are provided in the right panel of the figure. Since we
consider median bids for small ranges of outside options, the theoretical benchmark is a range of bidding
functions. In the figure, the equilibrium bidding function for the expected value of the outside option
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Table 4: Regression results
Treatment expl. var. coeff. βˆx robust σβx t P > |t| 95% conf. interval
A constant 0.2770354 2.494552 0.11 0.919 -7.661742 8.215813
v 0.8626416 0.0248474 34.72 0.000 0.783566 0.9417172
B constant 1.8715710 1.1418200 1.64 0.162 -1.06357 4.806713
v 0.7964621 0.0123155 64.67 0.000 0.7648041 0.82812
w -0.7668116 0.0254442 -30.14 0.000 -0.8322181 -0.7014051
A+B constant 2.3330420 1.532425 1.52 0.162 -1.133545 5.7996280
v 0.8275259 0.0179942 45.99 0.000 0.7868202 0.8682317
w -0.8527819 0.0253570 -33.63 0.000 -0.9101434 -0.7945203
conditional on the particular outside option range is drawn as a patterned line. It is embedded in an area
of equal shading that contains all equilibrium bidding functions given the particular outside option range.
By construction, every shaded area represents a different theoretical benchmark that corresponds to the
observed median bids. It can be seen that the strong outside option pattern in the data is qualitatively
predicted by theory. Median bidding functions appear to lie above their theoretical counterparts.
Table 5 reports the results from a linear regression that explains observed bids with the equilibrium
bidding prediction and the value of outside options.7 If subjects were to bid according to the theoretical
benchmark, the coefficient of the equilibrium prediction would equal unity. For treatment C, βˆbC(xi)
significantly exceeds unity (t = 5.446, p = 0.001, two-tailed). From this it cannot be directly concluded
that there is overbidding on average since other coefficients are significant, too. In particular, the estimate
for the constant is negative as is the coefficient on the interaction term. However, it is straightforward to
show that there is no valuation pair (v, wi) ∈ [50, 100] × [0, 50] that leads to a bid predicted from the
estimated regression model lower than the corresponding theoretical equilibrium prediction.8
Theory also predicts that only net valuations, i.e. the difference between object valuation and outside
option value, matter for bidding and not their individual levels. If subjects were to bid according to this
7Again, we account for the fact that observations are independent between but not within matching groups.
8The bidding prediction from the estimated model is bˆC = −12.99646 + 1.610504bC(xi) + 0.3347499wi −
0.0085359bC(xi)wi. There is global overbidding if for all xi ≡ vi−wi the inequality bˆC ≥ bC(xi) is not violated, equivalently
0.610504bC(xi) + 0.3347499wi − 0.0085359bC(xi)wi ≥ 12.99646.
Since bC(xi) is monotonic increasing, the lowest bid for xi ≥ 50 is bC(50) = 100/3. Using this value with the above inequality
leads to 7.3537 + 0.05022wi ≥ 0.This holds due to nonnegative outside options. It remains to check the above inequality for
xi < 50. Substitution of bC(xi < 50) = 2/3(vi − wi) yields
vi ≥
12.99646 + 0.072 25wi − 0.0056906w2i
0.407− 0.0056906wi
.
The maximum of the RHS is 42.633 (at wi = 27.665) while the lowest valuation vi is 50. Thus, the inequality is never violated
confirming global overbidding.
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Figure 10: Bidding behavioral effects of private outside options
prediction, then the coefficient of the outside option would equal zero. The estimation results show that
the coefficient of the private outside option’s value, βˆwi , significantly exceeds zero.
Table 5: Regression results: Deviations from Nash bids
Treatment expl. var. coeff. βˆx robust σβx t P > |t| 95% conf. interval
C constant -12.99646 4.655477 -2.79 0.027 -24.00491 -1.988004
bC(xi) 1.610504 0.1120983 14.37 0.000 1.34544 1.875567
wi 0.3347499 0.110117 3.04 0.019 0.0743646 0.5951352
bC(xi) ·wi -0.0085359 0.0022247 -3.84 0.006 -0.0137965 -0.0032753
4.3.3 Effects of outside option type
We have reported that both types of outside options, private and public, decisively affect bidding behavior
of subjects. The difference between the two types lies in their associated common knowledge sets. With
public outside options, each subject knows that any competing bidder is faced with the same outside
option value. Whereas under the private outside option regime, each subject is uncertain about it and
only knows the underlying distribution. Here, we investigate if the particular type of outside options
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affects observed bidding behavior. For this we estimate the regression model9
bj = βoB ·B + β1B ·B · vj + β2B ·B · wj
+βoC ·C + β1C ·C · vj + β2C ·C · wj + εj
where B and C are treatment-specific dummy variables with pooled data from treatments B and C. The
specification follows from equilibrium bidding in treatment B. The results are reported in table 6. Under
the hypothesis that the type of outside options does not influence bidding behavior, the estimated coeffi-
cients for treatment B should be no different from the estimates for treatment C. Testing the hypothesis
Table 6: Regression results: Effects of outside option types
Treatment expl. var. coeff. βˆx robust σˆβx t P > |t| 95% conf. interval
B+C B 1.871571 1.081695 1.73 0.107 -0.4652893 4.208432
B · vj 0.7964621 0.011667 68.27 0.000 0.7712571 0.8216671
B ·wj -0.7668116 0.0241044 -31.81 0.000 -0.8188861 -0.7147372
C -0.9549387 2.989683 -0.32 0.754 -7.413756 5.503879
C · vj 0.7820828 0.0374816 20.87 0.000 0.7011088 0.8630568
C ·wj -0.6941989 0.023007 -30.17 0.000 -0.7439024 -0.6444953
that all estimated coefficients for treatment B coincide with their counterparts for treatment C can be
significantly rejected (F3,13 = 4.70, p = 0.0196 ). Pairwise comparisons of the estimates indicate that
only the coefficients of the outside options significantly differ from one another (t = 2.179, p = 0.0483,
two-tailed). It appears that the subtle difference in common knowledge stemming from different types
of outside options affects bidding behavior. In particular, more valuable outside options lead to stronger
relaxations of aggressive bidding under public outside options than under private outside options as the-
oretically expected.10 Therefore, the details of common knowledge may matter more than suggested
elsewhere.11
4.4 Efficiency and outside options
In this section, we investigate if outside options influence the efficiency generated by first-price sealed-
bid auctions. An allocation is Pareto-efficient if the bidder with the highest net valuation, x ≡ v − w,
is awarded the object in the auction and the loser seizes the outside option (in the baseline treatment,
the value of the outside option equals zero such that v = w). One measure of efficiency is the relative
9Again, we take into account that observations are independent between but not within matching groups.
10Notice that ∂bB/∂w = −1 and ∂bC/∂wi ≤ −2/3.
11Güth and Ivanova-Stenzel (2003) report that the manipulation of common knowledge in asymmetric private value auctions
(competitor’s valuation distribution is know/unknown) "changes behavior only slightly and hardly ever in significant ways." (p.
198f.)
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frequency of Pareto-efficient allocations. As table 7 suggests, there do not seem to be large differences
between the treatments, though the numbers for treatment B are somewhat lower and relative frequencies
for the first six rounds are slightly greater such that efficiency may slightly increase over time.
Table 7: Relative frequencies of Pareto efficient allocations
Treatment rounds 1-6 rounds 7-12 rounds 1-12
A no outside options 82.5% 86.4% 84.4%
B public outside options 78.5% 83.2% 80.9%
C private outside options 82.4% 85.5% 83.9%
To test for treatment differences and time effects, let Ei,r denote the relative frequency of Pareto-
efficient allocations with the participation of subject i in round r. Let A, B, and C be treatment dum-
mies and LA, LB, and LC be treatment-specific dummies that indicate if the observation was gener-
ated in rounds 1-6 (L=0) or in rounds 7-12 (L=1). The estimation results for the regression model
E = β0A+β1B+β2C+β3LA+β4LB+β5LC are summarized in table 8.12 In all treatments, alloca-
tions significantly tend to be more often Pareto-efficient if realized in the second half of the experiments
(p < 0.075, two-tailed t-tests). However, pairwise tests for differences between coefficient estimates for
the treatment dummies A,B, and C reveal no significant differences between treatments A and C and B
and C (p > 0.124, two-tailed t-tests) in the level of efficiency; however, there is a significant difference
between treatments A and B (p = 0.0989, two-tailed t-test).
Table 8: Regression results: Efficiency by treatment
expl. var. coeff. βˆx robust σˆβx t P > |t| 95% conf. interval
A 0.8248175 0.0142926 57.71 0.000 0.7946627 0.8549723
B 0.7851133 0.0176889 44.38 0.000 0.7477930 0.8224335
C 0.8238318 0.0160860 51.21 0.000 0.7898933 0.8577702
LA 0.0389506 0.0199635 1.95 0.068 -0.0031687 0.0810699
LB 0.0469380 0.0247687 1.90 0.075 -0.0053194 0.0991954
LC 0.0307979 0.0082316 3.74 0.002 0.0134307 0.0481650
A disadvantage of the relative frequency as an efficiency measure is that it treats every inefficient
allocation in the same way, although it seems reasonable to discriminate between "large" inefficiencies
(where the winner of the auction has a much lower net valuation) and "small" inefficiencies (where both
bidders have similar net valuations.) One approach to discriminate between "small" and "large" ineffi-
ciencies is to compare the outcome of an auction to that of some other allocation mechanism, in particular
a random allocation (see Kirchkamp and Moldovanu, 2004). Recall that in our experiment subjects were
12The method of estimation accounted for possibly correlated observations within matching groups and used independence
between matching groups.
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matched pairwise in each round. In each round every subject specified a bidding schedule that allowed
her to bid against her matching partner in five unrelated auctions. For each of the five auctions in a
round, subjects received a randomly drawn valuation that implied their bids in that auction via the spec-
ified bidding schedule. Let xmax =
P
amax{x1,a, x2,a} where xi,a denotes the net valuation of bidder
i = 1, 2 in a matching group for auction a = 1,...,5 in any round. Let xrand =
P
a (x1,a + x2,a) /2,
then the additional surplus that auctions theoretically generate compared to random allocations for any
matched bidder pair is xmax − xrand. Let xw =
P
a x
w
a where xwa is the net valuation of the actual winner
of auction a and define the auction performance index as (xw − xrand)/(xmax − xrand) multiplied by
100 that measures the additional surplus generated from auctions compared to random allocations as a
fraction of the largest additional surplus that can be obtained from any allocation mechanism. The per-
formance index equals 100 if each auction outcome is Pareto-efficient meaning that auctions realized the
maximum surplus that can be generated in addition to expected random allocation surplus. If there is at
least one inefficient outcome, the index is lower than 100. The less similar are net valuations underlying
an inefficient outcome and the fewer efficient outcomes, the larger the efficiency loss and the lower the
performance index. If the outcomes of all five auctions are inefficient, the index equals -100. Table 9
displays the performance indices averaged over matching groups and rounds by treatment.
Table 9: Mean Performance Indices
Treatment rounds 1-6 rounds 7-12 rounds 1-12
A no outside options 81.83 86.98 84.41
B public outside options 71.46 77.12 74.31
C private outside options 76.93 83.14 80.05
To test for treatment differences, let Pi,r denote the performance index of the auctions in which
subject i participated in round r. Replacing the dependent variable of the above given regression model
with the performance index leads to results that are contained in table 8.13 With the auction performance
index, the time dummies for treatments A and B becomes insignificant whereas that for treatment A
differs significantly from zero. Moreover, there is a significant difference between the coefficients of
treatment dummies A and B (p = 0.0241, two-tailed t-test). There are no significant difference between
the dummy coefficient estimates for A and C and B and C ( p > 0.240, two-tailed t-tests).
Taken together, there appears to be evidence that there the degree of efficiency is higher in treatment
A than in treatment B and that seem to be no significant efficiency differences with regard to the type,
public or private, of the outside option. Though the share of Pareto-efficient allocations suggest at first
that there are time effects, these happen to be insignificant with the Performance index.
Another popular approach to operationalize discrimination between "large" and "small" inefficiencies is to
13Again, the method of estimation accounted for possibly correlated observations within matching groups and used indepen-
dence between matching groups.
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Table 10: Regression results: Mean Efficiency Indices by Treatment
expl. var. coeff. βˆx robust σˆβx t P > |t| 95% conf. interval
A 0.8183129 0.0286358 28.58 0.000 0.7578966 0.8787291
B 0.7146016 0.0305467 23.39 0.000 0.6501536 0.7790496
C 0.7693319 0.0330471 23.28 0.000 0.6996086 0.8390551
LA 0.0514690 0.0404038 1.27 0.220 -0.0337756 0.1367136
LB 0.0566345 0.0461333 1.23 0.236 -0.0406983 0.1539673
LC 0.0620467 0.0197158 3.15 0.006 0.0204500 0.1036435
define the efficiency index as the ratio of the winner’s net valuation to the largest net valuation of the two bidders
multiplied by 100 (see e.g. Cox et al., 1982). The efficiency rate is 100 if the allocation is Pareto-efficient. If it is
lower than 100, the bidder with the highest net valuation has not won the auction. The lower it is, the larger the
gap between the net valuations of the bidders. Mean efficiency rates for treatment A: 98.66, B: 96.53, C: 96.51.
4.5 Concavity of bidding functions
An interesting feature of equilibrium bidding functions with private outside options is their concavity in
valuations v with uniform distributions that intensifies as the outside option’s value decreases (see section
2.2.4. on page 6). One possibility to capture this property is to define a concavity measure that relates
bid differences corresponding to high valuations to those corresponding to low valuations, particularly
K(wi) ≡
£
bC(60, wi)− bC(50, wi)
¤
−
£
bC(100, wi)− bC(90, wi)
¤
+δ
©£
bC(70, wi)− bC(60, wi)
¤
−
£
bC(90, wi)− bC(80, wi)
¤ª
where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. The choice of this particular measure is guided by the fact that subjects entered
their bids for valuations 50,60,...,100. For a strictly concave bidding function, the concavity measure is
positive, for a linear function it is zero. The first line aims at capturing the strength of global concavity
assuming the curve to be nonconvex between valuations 60 and 90. The second line revises the concavity
measure downward with weight δ if there is some convexity of the bidding schedule between valuations
60 and 90, concavity over this interval revises K(wi) upward. For the following discussion, we set
δ = 0.5. All conclusions drawn below do not depend on the particular choice of δ.
Given the particular equilibrium bidding function bC(vi, wi), the concavity measure strictly decreases
as the outside option’s value increases. For the largest outside option value we have K(wi = 50) = 0
since bC(vi, 50) is a linear function. The theoretical concavity measure is contrasted with its observed
realizations represented by a median spline in figure 11 where the median spline is constructed from in-
dividual bidding data that is subject-wise averaged over rounds with identical outside options.The figure
points to a relationship between the curvature of observed bidding functions and the value of the outside
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Figure 11: Concavity of observed mean bidding functions for private outside options
option that qualitatively matches the theoretical prediction of more intense concavity for low outside op-
tion values. However, the influence of outside options on bidding function concavity seems to be weaker
than theoretically expected. Interestingly, aggregate bidding functions are definitely not convex which
would be indicated by a negative value of K(wi). A few bidding schedules that we obtained are provided
in the appendix. Robust estimation (that accounts for possibly correlated observations within matching
groups) of the linear model K = β0 + β1w provides evidence for bidding function concavity (positive
intercept) and a negative relation between concavity and larger outside option valuation (βˆ0 = 3.56,
t7 = 4.15, p = 0.014 and βˆ1 = −0.089, t7 = −2.82, p = 0.026).
The discussed concavity property of equilibrium bidding functions is induced by private outside
options. In contrast, equilibrium bidding functions with public outside options are predicted to be linear.
The finding in the data for treatment C that lower outside options lead to a more concave bidding function
is then only an indicator of prediction quality of theory if there is no such relationship in the data for
treatment B. To see this, we robustly estimate the model14
K = β0B + β1B ·w + β2C + β3C · w
with pooled data for treatments B and C where the explanatory variables B and C serve as treatment-
specific dummy variables. The results are given in table 11 and indicate that for public outside options
neither a significant effect of the outside option value on the concavity measure nor mean concavity
(insignificant intercept) can be identified.15
14The estimation method accounts for possible correlations within matching groups.
15If data for treatment B is augmented by data from treatment A that can be viewed as a special case of treatment B, then
the coefficient of the outside option value βˆ1 remains insignificant (t15 = −0.53, p = 0.606) but the estimate of the intercept
βˆ0 = 1.493 becomes significant (t15 = 3.54, p = 0.003). However, the intercept for treatment C is significantly larger than
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Table 11: Regression results: Concavity with private and public outside options
expl. var. coeff. βˆx robust σˆβx t P > |t| 95% conf. interval
B 1.515362 1.532773 0.99 0.341 -1.795993 4.826718
B · w -0.0059506 0.0380048 -0.16 0.878 -0.088055 0.0761538
C 3.557907 0.8332235 4.27 0.001 1.757837 5.357977
C · w -0.0886455 0.0305614 -2.90 0.012 -0.1546695 -0.0226216
Thus, bidding function concavity appears to be related to the value of outside options only if these
are of the private type.
Another prediction related to the curvature of equilibrium bidding functions with private outside
options is its linearity in net valuations if x ≤ 50 and its strict concavity if x > 50, see Figure 4 on p.
8. To test if this property is reproduced in the laboratory, we investigate the bidding data for x ≤ 50 and
x > 50 separately and fit to both samples a piecewise-linear function with two segments where segments
connect at x = 25 or x = 75 depending on the sample. If the slope over the first segment equals the
slope over the second segment, the estimated function is linear. If the slope over the first segment is
greater than the slope over the second segment, the estimated function is concave. The two models that
we robustly estimate can be compactly written as16
bi,s = β0,s + β1,sx
1
i,s + β1,sx
2
i,s
where β1,s is the slope over the first segment and β2,s is the slope over the second segment of net
valuations in sample s. If xi ≤ 50 then s = 1 otherwise s = 3. To directly estimate the segment-specific
slopes, the explanatory data on net valuations is transformed as follows:
x1i,s =



xi,s if xi,s ∈ [25(s− 1), 25s]
25s if xi,s ∈ (25s, 25(s+ 1)]
x2i,s =



xi,s − 25s if xi,s ∈ [(25s, 25(s+ 1)]
0 if xi,s ∈ (25(s− 1), 25s]
The estimates are summarized in table 12. As predicted, the estimated bidding function in net valuations
is linear over the interval [0, 50] since the slopes over the two segment 0-25 and 25-50 do not significantly
differ (t7 = 1.114, p = 0.3019, two-tailed). In contrast and in line with the prediction, the estimated
bidding function over the interval [50, 100] appears to be concave since its slope over the first segment
50-75 (βˆ1 = 0.819) is significantly larger than its slope over the second segment 75-100 (βˆ2 = 0.502;
t7 = 3.889, p = 0.003, one-tailed).
the intercept for treatments A and B (t15 = 2.22, p = 0.0211,one-tailed).
16The estimation procedure allows for possibly correlated observations within matching groups.
25
Table 12: Regression results: Concavity of estimated bidding function bC(x)
sample expl. var. coeff. βˆx robust σˆβx t P > |t| 95% conf. interval
s = 1 constant 2.450964 1.916258 1.28 0.242 -2.080265 6.982194
(x ≤ 50) x0-25≤50 0.7826128 0.054495 14.36 0.000 0.6537527 0.9114729
x25-50≤50 0.7081456 0.0232956 30.40 0.000 0.6530603 0.763231
s = 3 constant -0.7507278 2.050539 -0.37 0.725 -5.599482 4.098026
(x > 50) x50-75>50 0.8189925 0.0278745 29.38 0.000 0.7530797 0.8849053
x75-100>50 0.5018675 0.07169889 7.00 0.000 0.3323267 0.6714084
5 Conclusion
We have introduced a bidding model that allows for public and private outside option and experimentally
tested it. A key feature of our experimental design is that we collected entire bidding functions. Theoret-
ically, higher-valued outside options lead to less aggressive bidding (ie. lower bids) than the first-price
model without outside options. Our experimental data reproduces this prediction. Private outside options
differ from public outside options in the set of common knowledge. This difference theoretically implies
that bidders respond to an increase of their outside option value with a larger reduction of bids under the
public outside option regime. This prediction is confirmed by the data. Private outside options should
lead to concave bidding functions, especially for low outside option values. We found this pattern in the
data on the aggregate level. However, the degree of concavity that is present in the data is much lower
than predicted. The stylized fact of "overbidding" is partially reproduced in our experiments. Taken
together, our analysis suggests that outside options crucially influence bidding behavior in a way that
is qualitatively predicted by theory and that the particular nature of outside options matters. However,
actual bidding behavior seems to deviate from the predictions in important ways.
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6 Appendix
Screenshots
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